Game Theory and Voting Systems
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Scope of this subject
This cluster of papers focuses on mechanism design, matching theory, and coalition formation in economics. It explores topics such as school choice, judgment aggregation, stability in matching markets, rank aggregation methods, and the application of game theory to economic design. The papers also delve into voting procedures, the Shapley value, and the intricacies of coalition formation.
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Research vocabulary
social choice; cooperative games; coalition formation; cooperative game theory; fair division; preference aggregation; axiomatization; voting rules; Shapley value; stable matching; core; strategy-proofness; majority rule; solution concepts; indivisible goods; Arrow's impossibility theorem; strategic voting; matching markets; impossibility results; two-sided matching; computational social choice; Borda count; transferable utility games; approval voting; power indices
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Local answer status
No owner-reviewed answer has been published for this exact subject page. This is a gap in this collection; it does not establish that the answer is unavailable elsewhere.
Numeric address and provenance
Morton address: 36174777798789848 · morton4x16-v1
Coordinates: (2, 20, 2002, 10991). The address interleaves categorical identifier bits. Nearby addresses are not guaranteed to describe semantically similar subjects.
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